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Note  
 
The Juvenile Ultimatum: Reframing Blended 
Sentencing Laws to Ensure Juveniles Receive a 
Genuine “One Last Chance at Success” 
Anabel Cassady∗ 
The State charged sixteen-year-old Derrick Smith with ag-
gravated robbery for assaulting another adolescent on the train 
and stealing his cell phone.1 Smith, who had a relatively clean 
juvenile delinquency history, other than a prior runaway and 
truancy offense, was found guilty in a Minnesota juvenile court. 
After finding Smith did not pose a threat to “public safety,”2 
and therefore declining to certify Smith as an “adult,”3 a juve-
nile court judge imposed a disposition under Minnesota’s Ex-
tended Jurisdiction Juvenile (EJJ) statute.4 Under this ruling, 
Smith was given both a juvenile disposition and an adult crim-
inal sentence—but, crucially, the adult criminal sentence would 
be stayed (that is, not executed) unless Smith violated the 
terms of his juvenile probation.5 Twelve months later, Smith 
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2018, University of Minnesota Law School. I am grate-
ful to Professors Perry Moriearty and Barry Feld for their invaluable guidance 
and feedback throughout the drafting process. I am also grateful for the exper-
tise and insight shared by juvenile public defenders as I began working on this 
project. Thank you to the editors and staff members of Minnesota Law Review 
who diligently edited this Note. And most importantly, thank you to my family 
for their unwavering love and support. Copyright © 2017 by Anabel Cassady. 
1. Hypothetical narrative to illustrate the workings of Minnesota’s Ex-
tended Jurisdiction Juvenile (EJJ). 
 2. See MINN. R. JUV. P. 19.05 (“In determining whether public safety 
would be served, the court shall take into account the following factors: (A) the 
seriousness of the alleged offense . . . (B) the culpability of the child in commit-
ting the alleged offense . . . (C) the child’s prior record of delinquency; (D) the 
child’s programming history . . . (E) the adequacy of the punishment or pro-
gramming available in the juvenile justice system; and (F) the dispositional 
options available for the child . . . .”). 
 3. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.125 (2017). 
 4. MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subdiv. 4(a). 
 5. Under section 260B.130, subdivision 4(a) of the Minnesota Statutes, 
the execution of an adult criminal disposition “shall be stayed on the condition 
that the offender not violate the provisions of the disposition order and not 
 392 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:391 
 
was found to have violated the terms of his probation for (1) 
testing positive for marijuana in one of his regular urinalysis 
(UA) tests, (2) being found in possession of marijuana when he 
was stopped for a curfew violation, and (3) failing to attend 
school on a regular basis. After a probation revocation hearing,6 
Smith’s original juvenile sentencing judge decided to revoke the 
stay of execution, thereby terminating juvenile court jurisdic-
tion and committing Smith to the Commissioner of Corrections 
to serve his adult criminal sentence.7 
Some may question whether Smith’s conduct would actual-
ly result in revocation of probation and execution of his stayed 
adult sentence. However, the Juvenile Justice Task Force, 
which proposed the creation of EJJ, “recommended that the 
court treat probation violations of EJJ offenders in the same 
manner as adults who had committed a new offense or violated 
the terms of probation, including execution of the adult stayed 
sentence.”8 In fact, an evaluation of EJJ-analyzed data collect-
ed from Hennepin County, Minnesota, between 1995 and 1997 
reported that “judges revoked the probation of more than one-
third (35.3%) of those youths sentenced as EJJs” and they “re-
voked the majority (76.23%) of EJJs youths’ probation for pro-
bation violations rather than for the commission of new offens-
es.”9 
 
commit a new offense.” Section 19.01(2)(A) of the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile 
Procedure defines “extended jurisdiction juvenile” as “a child has been given a 
stayed adult criminal sentence, a disposition under Minnesota Statutes, sec-
tion 260B.198, and for whom jurisdiction of the juvenile court may continue 
until the child’s twenty-first (21st) birthday.” 
 6. See id. § 260B.130, subdiv. 5(c). 
 7. Id. § 260B.130, subdiv. 5(d). 
 8. Kathryn A. Santelmann & Kari L. Lillesand, Extended Jurisdiction 
Juveniles in Minnesota: A Prosecutor ’s Perspective, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
1303, 1313 (1999). Under Rule 19 of the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Delin-
quency Procedure, the juvenile court judge is authorized to “execute the stayed 
prison sentence after revocation of extended jurisdiction juvenile status” if the 
court finds the following: “(a) one or more conditions of probation were violat-
ed; (b) the violation was intentional or inexcusable; and (c) the need for con-
finement outweighs the policies favoring probation.” MINN. R. JUV. 
P. 19.11(3)(C)(2). See generally Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: 
A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965 (1995) 
(explaining the genesis and rationale of EJJ prosecution). 
 9. Marcy R. Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, The Back-Door to Prison: Waiver 
Reform, Blended Sentencing, and the Law of Unintended Consequences, 91 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 997, 1058–59 (2001). Since this finding, the Minneso-
ta Supreme Court in State v. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d 763, 768–69 (Minn. 2003), has 
ruled that in order to revoke probation and execute a stayed adult sentence, 
the court must look to the three Austin factors. See State v. Austin, 295 
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Known as the “pioneer of extended juvenile jurisdiction,”10 
Minnesota enacted its current juvenile waiver law in 1995.11 
Under the program, a juvenile court judge can impose both a 
juvenile delinquency sentence and an adult criminal sentence—
the execution of which is stayed pending successful completion 
of the delinquency disposition.12 Minnesota’s EJJ law was in-
tended “to give juveniles ‘one last chance at success in the juve-
nile justice system, with the threat of adult sanctions as an in-
centive not to reoffend.’”13 Juvenile justice scholars have 
observed, however, that the implementation of EJJ has result-
ed in a “net-widening” effect on juvenile offenders and other un-
intended collateral consequences relating to the state’s youth.14 
As the above hypothetical demonstrates, youth sentenced un-
der the EJJ statute have been deemed not to pose a “public 
safety” threat, which would otherwise justify an adult prison 
sentence, yet, “a new offense, which itself would not warrant 
[adult] certification, may provide the basis to revoke probation 
and execute the adult criminal sentence.”15 
 
N.W.2d 246, 251 (Minn. 1980). While the court in State v. B.Y. conceded that 
“[t]he public is not particularly well served by automatic incarceration on a 
technical violation,” these factors do not outright preclude revoking probation 
for a technical probation violation, nor do they require the commission of a 
new criminal offense in order to execute the stayed adult sentence. 659 
N.W.2d at 768–69. The court concluded that in order “for a court to revoke 
probation and execute a previously stayed adult sentence for technical viola-
tions of EJJ probation, the violations must demonstrate that the offender 
‘cannot be counted on to avoid antisocial activity.’” Id. at 772 (quoting Austin, 
295 N.W.2d at 251). The three Austin factors have since been codified in Rule 
19 of the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure. For a further 
discussion on probation revocations and the Austin factors, see infra Part I.C. 
 10. Chauncey E. Brummer, Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction: The Best of 
Both Worlds?, 54 ARK. L. REV. 777, 792 (2002). 
 11. Kathryn A. Santelmann & Kara Rafferty, Juvenile Law Develop-
ments—“One Last Chance”: Applying Adult Standards to Extended Jurisdic-
tion Juvenile Proceedings—State v. B.Y., 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 427, 428 
(2003). 
 12. Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 9, at 999. 
 13. Santelmann & Rafferty, supra note 11, at 431–32 (quoting ADVISORY 
TASK FORCE ON THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM, MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT, 
FINAL REPORT 31, 33 (1994)). 
 14. Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 9, at 1028–30. For a further discussion, 
see infra Part II.A. 
 15. Id. at 1028. Probation violations need not include criminal conduct. 
Failure to complete community service hours, or failure to meet with a proba-
tion officer may constitute “technical violations of probation.” As Podkopacz 
and Feld found in their study, “The combination of a non-certifiable prior of-
fense and a non-criminal probation violation expose[s] these youths to the pos-
sibility of an adult criminal sentence.” Id. at 1059–60. 
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Juvenile justice is at a crossroads, with both scientific dis-
coveries regarding adolescent brain development and reform 
efforts amending the ways that juvenile offenders are treated.16 
As one scholar put it, “[J]uvenile crime regulation is ‘in flux,’ 
describing a post-moral-panic period in which different regula-
tory approaches have begun to take hold.”17 With more than 2.2 
million individuals locked behind bars in the United States18—
a 700% increase over the last forty years19—there has been a 
growing trend in this country towards ending the problem of 
mass incarceration and addressing other auxiliary issues asso-
ciated with our criminal justice system. For example, John 
Legend’s recent #FREEAMERICA campaign—which advocates 
for criminal justice reform and keeping youth out of prisons20—
proclaims, “[t]he issues of mass incarceration and the school-to-
prison pipeline, coupled with nationwide protests over the 
deaths of unarmed young men and women of color, provide an 
unprecedented opportunity for all of us to get involved in crim-
inal justice reform efforts.”21 Recognizing that “adolescents are 
children, and prosecuting and placing them in the adult crimi-
nal justice system doesn’t work for them and doesn’t work for 
public safety,”22 recent Raise the Age campaigns—which aim to 
extend juvenile court jurisdiction over juveniles that would 
otherwise be prosecuted in the adult court system—have been 
successfully enacted into law in several states.23 With a grow-
 
 16. See infra Part I.B (discussing the Supreme Court’s recognition that 
juveniles are “constitutionally different from adults” and thus should be treat-
ed differently for sentencing purposes). 
 17. OWEN D. JONES, JEFFREY D. SCHALL, & FRANCIS X. SHEN, LAW AND 
NEUROSCIENCE 554 (2014) (citing Elizabeth S. Scott, “Children are Different”: 
Constitutional Values and Justice Policy, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 71 (2013)). 
 18. Mass Incarceration, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/mass 
-incarceration (last visited Oct. 13, 2017). 
 19. FREEAMERICA, HTTP://LETSFREEAMERICA.ORG (LAST VISITED OCT. 
13, 2017) (noting this staggering increase despite a decrease in crime). 
 20. Danielle DeCourcey, Why John Legend Says We’re Failing Thousands 
of Young Americans, ATTN: (Mar. 9, 2017), http://www.attn.com/stories/15502/ 
why-john-legend-says-were-failing-thousands-young-americans. 
 21. FREEAMERICA, supra note 19.  
 22. Get the Facts, RAISE THE AGE NY, http://raisetheageny.com/get-the 
-facts (last visited Oct. 13, 2017). 
 23. JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, RAISE THE AGE: SHIFTING TO A SAFER AND 
MORE EFFECTIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 4 (2016), http://www.justicepolicy 
.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/raisetheagesummary_final_3_6_16.pdf 
(showing that in 2013, the Massachusetts and Illinois governors signed Raise 
the Age into law in their respective states; in June 2016, the Louisiana Gover-
nor signed Raise the Age into law). Mississippi and Connecticut have passed 
similar legislation. Id.  
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ing number of states extending juvenile court jurisdiction and 
adult certification coming under fire post-Miller v. Alabama,24 
the natural question in juvenile justice reform becomes: What 
about the hybrid model? 
This Note argues that Minnesota’s blended sentencing 
scheme, while flawed, can be amended to resolve these prob-
lems. Part I gives a history and overview of juvenile transfer 
laws. It includes a discussion of the ideological differences be-
tween juvenile and adult court jurisdictions and the evolution 
of blended sentencing schemes—including the passage of Min-
nesota’s EJJ law. Part II analyzes the shortfalls of Minnesota’s 
EJJ statute, including its disproportionate impact on racial mi-
norities and younger, less criminally sophisticated offenders. 
Additionally, Part II evaluates the efficacy of juvenile probation 
and identifies a disconnect between the State (that is, judges, 
probation officers, prosecutors and other law enforcement per-
sonnel) and its youth. It argues that revoking a juvenile’s stay 
of execution for mere probation violations not only deepens the 
“net-widening” effect of the EJJ statute, but also demonstrates 
a misunderstanding of how criminal justice involvement affects 
youth and impacts their future.25 It also ignores critical impli-
cations of adolescent brain development.26 
Part III argues that revoking EJJ adjudications and impos-
ing adult sentences for probation violations should be prohibit-
ed in the absence of a new offense—especially given the ease 
with which probation can be revoked and a stayed adult sen-
tence executed. The statute should be amended to require the 
commission of a new criminal offense in order to execute the 
original stayed adult sentence, and it should include certain 
procedural safeguards before a juvenile judge can revoke the 
stay of execution. Specifically, the statute should be amended 
so that judges deciding whether to revoke a youth’s probation 
and execute the stayed adult sentence would be required to 
hold a hearing, similar to a certification hearing, which is the 
proper forum for determining whether the juvenile actually 
 
 24. 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (contending “children are constitutionally 
different from adults for purposes of sentencing” and thus certain sentences 
constitutionally permissible for adult offenders violate the Eighth Amendment 
when imposed on juveniles). 
 25. See generally SHELLY SCHAEFER & GINA ERICKSON, NAT’L INST. OF 
JUSTICE, THE IMPACT OF JUVENILE CORRECTIONAL CONFINEMENT ON THE 
TRANSITION TO ADULTHOOD (May 25, 2016), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 
nij/grants/249925.pdf. For further discussion, see infra Part II.B. 
 26. See infra Part II.B. 
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poses a threat to public safety.27 The statute should also be 
changed to include a stay of imposition in addition to the stay 
of execution, which would provide another incentive for EJJ 
youth to successfully complete probation.28 Under a stay of im-
position, a juvenile’s felony sentence would be reduced to a 
gross misdemeanor, if and when probation is successfully com-
pleted. Part III concludes that if EJJ is amended and imple-
mented in a way that balances the interests of society with the 
interests of an EJJ-youth deemed not to pose a threat to public 
safety, then the legislation may serve as a model for other 
states in the growing trend toward extending juvenile court ju-
risdiction and the broader movement of criminal justice re-
form.29 
 
 27. This proposed amendment was briefly mentioned in the piece written 
by Podkopacz and Feld. Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 9, at 1071 (“Instead of 
remitting EJJ youths’ adult status to probation revocation proceedings, the 
legislature should amend the statute to require judges to consider whether a 
youth’s earlier offense and subsequent violations pose a threat to ‘public safe-
ty’ warranting imprisonment using the same procedures and criteria employed 
to certify youths for criminal prosecution.”). In a telephone conversation with 
Professor Feld on December 28, 2016, he suggested I propose this reform, as it 
is the best solution that would address the net-widening problem identified in 
his former piece with Podkopacz. Telephone Interview with Barry Feld, Cen-
tennial Professor of Law, Univ. of Minn. Law Sch. (Dec. 28, 2016). 
 28. The stay of imposition suggestion was provided by an anonymous ju-
venile public defender. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Juvenile Public 
Defender (Feb. 13, 2017). 
 29. It should be noted that blended sentencing, and in particular, Minne-
sota’s EJJ statute, appears to be an area of the law that is under-researched, 
under-studied, and under-published, making it hard to get data and therefore 
evaluate the efficacy of the system. In an effort to obtain recent data on the 
number of, and reasons for, probation revocations in Minnesota, I reached out 
to Minnesota’s State Court Administrator ’s Office, but was told they could not 
provide me with this “summary data” given “[t]he effort required to calculate 
probation violations and re-offenses that lead to EJJ withdrawals would be 
fairly extensive and there are no labor resources available for that effort . . . .” 
The researcher with the Minnesota Judicial Branch stated “[they] may have to 
figure out a way to get [me] case numbers for cases that have EJJ withdrawn. 
[I] could then perform the analysis [myself ], and determine on a case-by-case 
basis the reason for withdrawal.” E-mail from Anonymous Research Analyst 
II, Minn. Judicial Branch to Anabel Cassady, J.D. Candidate, Univ. of Minn. 
Law Sch. (Feb. 28, 2017, 15:49 CST) (on file with author). Thus, this Note lays 
out a theoretical framework for why this particular issue is one that needs to 
be resolved, and the ways in which the EJJ statute could be amended to ad-
dress these challenges. The embedded assumptions and arguments rely on a 
comprehensive study analyzing data collected from Hennepin County, Minne-
sota, between 1995 and 1997, phone interviews with juvenile public defenders, 
input from Professor Barry Feld who conducted the aforementioned study and 
served as a member and subcommittee chair of the 1992–1994 Minnesota Ju-
 2017] REFRAMING BLENDED SENTENCING LAWS 397 
 
I.  THE EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE TRANSFER LAWS AND 
BLENDED SENTENCING SCHEMES, AND THE PASSAGE 
OF MINNESOTA’S EXTENDED JURISDICTION JUVENILE   
Juvenile transfer laws allow a youth’s case to be trans-
ferred from juvenile court to adult court for prosecution. While 
juvenile transfer laws are not a new phenomenon,30 today’s ju-
venile transfer laws are largely the product of the “superpreda-
tor” ideology of the early 1990s, and the fear that unprecedent-
ed numbers of youth were going to create “a blood bath of 
violence.”31 This Part reviews the history of juvenile transfer 
laws and discusses the influence of the superpredator ideology 
on the proliferation of automatic and prosecutor-controlled 
types of transfers. Part I also discusses the ideological differ-
ences between juvenile and adult court systems and the evolu-
tion of blended sentencing schemes, including the passage of 
Minnesota’s EJJ statute. 
A. A HISTORY AND OVERVIEW OF JUVENILE TRANSFER LAWS 
On April 19, 1989, a young stockbroker named Trisha Meili 
was raped and severely beaten while jogging in Central Park.32 
Five male youths, who became known as the Central Park Five, 
confessed to the crime and subsequently served sentences rang-
 
venile Justice Task Force that created the statute, and a broad swath of litera-
ture. 
 30. See Patrick Griffin et al., Trying Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of 
State Transfer Laws and Reporting, NAT’L REP. SERIES (Office of Juvenile Jus-
tice and Deliquency Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 
2011, at 8, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/232434.pdf (“Laws allowing 
juvenile courts to waive jurisdiction over individual youth, sending ‘hard cases’ 
to criminal courts for adult prosecution, could be found in some of the earliest 
juvenile codes . . . . Most states had enacted such judicial waiver laws by the 
1950s, and they had become nearly universal by the 1970s.”). 
 31. Clyde Haberman, When Youth Violence Spurred ‘Superpredator ’ Fear, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us/politics/ 
killing-on-bus-recalls-superpredator-threat-of-90s.html (referring to the su-
perpredator era and explaining that while “[s]ocial scientists like James A. 
Fox, a criminologist, warned of ‘a blood bath of violence’ that could soon wash 
over the land,” these “jeremiads” proved to be wrong. The mistaken fears 
“were based on a notion that there would be hordes upon hordes of depraved 
teenagers resorting to unspeakable brutality, not tethered by conscience.”). 
 32. N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the 
Myth of the Bestial Black Man, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1315–16 (2004). 
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ing between seven and eleven years.33 In August 2002, Matias 
Reyes, a convicted rapist and murderer, finally confessed to the 
egregious crime, and the convictions of the five youth—all of 
whom had already served their sentences—were subsequently 
vacated.34 Nevertheless, in response to the charges against the 
Central Park Five and the corresponding rise in juvenile vio-
lence,35 “prominent and influential individuals . . . made doom 
and gloom predictions about the emergence of a ‘generational 
wolfpack’ of ‘fatherless, Godless and jobless’ youth,” and the 
term superpredators was coined to refer to the supposedly law-
less and violent youth dominating the nation’s city streets.36 
Due to the public safety concerns over the rise in youth 
crime, and provoked by the media, “legislatures in nearly every 
state revised or rewrote their laws to lower thresholds and 
broaden eligibility for transfer, shift transfer decision-making 
authority from judges to prosecutors, and replace individual-
ized discretion with automatic and categorical mechanisms.”37 
Although “the predicted adolescent ‘crime wave’ never materi-
alized,”38 forty-nine states and the District of Columbia enacted 
or expanded adult court transfer laws throughout the 1990s.39 
Such laws allowed or required juvenile offenders to be prose-
cuted in adult criminal courts.40 These legislative reforms of 
the 1990s led to a “wholesale transfer of youths into the adult 
criminal system—more than 250,000 a year by most esti-
mates.”41 Since the early 1990s, every state except Nebraska 
 
 33. LIZ RYAN, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, YOUTH IN THE ADULT CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (2012), https://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/ 
images/policybriefs/policyreform/FR_YACJS_2012.pdf. 
 34. Duru, supra note 32, at 1317. 
 35. JAMES ALAN FOX, TRENDS IN JUVENILE VIOLENCE: A REPORT TO THE 
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL ON CURRENT AND FUTURE RATES OF JU-
VENILE OFFENDING (1996), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tjvfox2.pdf 
(“From 1985 to 1994, the rate of murder committed by teens, ages 14–17, in-
creased 172 percent.”). 
 36. RYAN, supra note 33. 
 37. Griffin et al., supra note 30, at 9. 
 38. BARRY C. FELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMIN-
ISTRATION 508 (3rd ed. 2009); see also Haberman, supra note 31. 
 39. Juveniles in Court: All States Allow Juveniles to Be Tried as Adults in 
Criminal Court Under Certain Circumstances, NAT’L REP. SERIES (Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Justice), June 
2003, at 7, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/195420.pdf. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Adolescence and the Regula-
tion of Youth Crime, in supra note 17 at 553. Note that only thirteen states re-
port the total number of juvenile transfers. Griffin et al., supra note 30, at 1. 
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has amended its transfer laws to make it easier to try juveniles 
in adult criminal court.42 As two prominent scholars note, 
“These various legal trends have resulted in the prosecution of 
more and younger youths in the criminal justice system.”43 
Today, there are three generic versions of juvenile transfer 
laws: (1) judicial waiver; (2) prosecutorial direct-file; and (3) 
statutory offense exclusion.44 The three approaches designate 
the decision of whether to prosecute a juvenile as an adult to 
different branches of government: the judicial, executive, or leg-
islative branch.45 Judicial waiver laws, the traditional method 
in determining whether to prosecute the youth as a juvenile or 
an adult,46 give the juvenile court judge the discretion to trans-
fer the case to the adult court system.47 This practice of “case-
by-case clinical assessment[] reflect[s] the traditional sentenc-
ing discretion characteristic of juvenile courts.”48 Forty-five 
states have enacted judicial waiver laws, including Minneso-
ta.49 
Under prosecutorial direct-file laws, juvenile and criminal 
courts share concurrent jurisdiction over certain offenses, and 
the prosecutor decides in which court to charge and try the 
case.50 There is no hearing, and often there are no formal 
standards, for deciding between the two jurisdictions.51 The 
reason for this broad, unchecked exercise of discretion is that 
“prosecutorial transfer is considered an executive function, 
 
 42. FELD, supra note 38, at 518. 
 43. Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 9, at 999; see also Barry C. Feld & Don-
na M. Bishop, Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court, in THE OXFORD HAND-
BOOK OF JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 801 (Barry C. Feld & Donna 
M. Bishop, eds., 2012) (explaining that the resulting impact of the “get tough” 
era “was a fundamental transformation of the jurisprudence and practice of 
transfer, change in the legal and cultural construction of adolescence, and a 
dramatic increase in the numbers of youths convicted and sentenced as 
adults”). 
 44. Griffin et al., supra note 30, at 2; see also Feld & Bishop, supra note 
43, at 802. 
 45. Feld & Bishop, supra note 43, at 802. 
 46. Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 9, at 1000. 
 47. Griffin et al., supra note 30, at 2. 
 48. FELD, supra note 38, at 511. 
 49. Griffin et al., supra note 30, at 2–3. 
 50. Id. at 2, 5 (“Laws in 15 states designate some category of cases in 
which both juvenile and criminal courts have jurisdiction, so prosecutors may 
choose to file in either one court or the other.”). 
 51. Id. at 5 (stating there is often “no opportunity for defendants to test 
(or even to know) the basis for a prosecutor ’s decision to proceed in criminal 
court”). 
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which is not subject to judicial review,” which also mean the 
otherwise required due process standards do not apply.52 Fif-
teen states have enacted prosecutorial discretion laws.53 
Statutory offense exclusion laws define certain classes of 
ages and offenses in which the case must be filed in adult crim-
inal court, and the adult criminal court is granted exclusive ju-
risdiction.54 In Minnesota, for example, statutory offense exclu-
sion laws apply only to sixteen- or seventeen-year-olds accused 
of murder.55 Twenty-nine states have enacted statutory offense 
exclusion laws,56 and such laws are responsible for the largest 
number of transfers to adult criminal court.57 
While judicial waiver laws were historically the most com-
mon type of transfer laws, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, 
“automatic and prosecutor-controlled forms of transfer prolifer-
ated steadily.”58 As the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention notes, “Between 
1986 and the end of the 1990s, the number of states with au-
tomatic transfer laws jumped from 20 to 38, and the number 
with prosecutorial discretion laws rose from 7 to 15.”59 
In addition to juvenile transfer laws, many states have one 
or more of the following schemes: (1) “once adult/always adult” 
laws; (2) reverse waiver laws; and (3) blended sentencing 
laws.60 “Once adult/always adult” laws, which are a form of au-
tomatic transfer laws, require a juvenile who has been prose-
cuted as an adult criminal in the past to be prosecuted as an 
adult criminal for any offense in the future.61 Thirty-four states 
have enacted “once adult/always adult” laws.62 Reverse waiver 
laws allow juveniles initially charged as adults to petition to 
have their adult criminal cases transferred back to juvenile 
 
 52. FELD, supra note 38, at 519. 
 53. Griffin et al., supra note 30, at 5. 
 54. Id. at 2. 
 55. Id. at 6. 
 56. Id. 
 57. FELD, supra note 38, at 519. 
 58. Griffin et al., supra note 30, at 8. 
 59. Id. at 9; see also Feld & Bishop, supra note 43, at 815 (“Judges waive 
about 7,500 cases annually, prosecutors direct-file about 27,000 youths in 
criminal courts, and youths charged with excluded offenses account for the 
remainder.”). 
 60. Griffin et al., supra note 30, at 2. 
 61. Id. at 2, 7. 
 62. Id. at 7. 
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court.63 Twenty-four states have enacted reverse waiver laws.64 
Blended sentencing schemes—the main focus of this Note—
allow judges to impose either, or both, a juvenile court disposi-
tion and adult criminal court sentence on certain classes of ju-
venile offenders.65 By the end of 2004, at least twenty-six states 
had a form of blended sentencing.66 
Juvenile justice policy experienced an ideological shift dur-
ing the superpredator era, making it easier to try young of-
fenders in adult criminal court.67 As the following Section will 
discuss, however, there are significant, inherent differences be-
tween juvenile and adult offenders, and undeniable harms that 
result from sending adolescents to adult correctional facilities. 
B. THE HISTORY AND REHABILITATIVE SPIRIT OF THE JUVENILE 
COURT SYSTEM, THE DANGERS OF SENDING YOUTH TO ADULT 
FACILITIES, AND THE INHERENT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 
JUVENILE AND ADULT OFFENDERS 
By the early twentieth century, states across the country 
began enacting “juvenile codes” with the belief that adult crim-
inal sanctions “were inappropriate for juveniles as they were 
rooted in penal rather than rehabilitative interests.”68 Advo-
cates of the rehabilitative model “envisioned a regime in which 
young offenders would receive treatment that would cure them 
of their antisocial ways—a system in which criminal responsi-
bility and punishment had no place.”69 In 1899, Chicago estab-
lished the nation’s first juvenile court, “thereby initiating the 
specialized treatment of America’s juvenile offenders” and seek-
ing to focus on rehabilitation, rather than retribution.70 By 
1925, all but two states had created a juvenile court system.71 
As the previous Section discussed, however, in response to the 
 
 63. Id. at 2, 7. 
 64. Id. at 7. 
 65. Fred Cheesman, A Decade of NCSC Research on Blended Sentencing 
of Juvenile Offenders: What Have We Learned About “Who Gets a Second 
Chance?”, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, FUTURE TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 
113 (2011), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/Future%20Trends/ 
Author%20PDFs/Cheesman.ashx.  
 66. Id. 
 67. Feld & Bishop, supra note 43, at 801. 
 68. Grace E. Shear, The Disregarding of the Rehabilitative Spirit of Juve-
nile Codes: Addressing Resentencing Hearings in Blended Sentencing Schemes, 
99 KY. L.J. 211, 213–14 (2010). 
 69. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 41, at 552. 
 70. Shear, supra note 68, at 211. 
 71. Id. at 214. 
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rise in juvenile crime rates during the early 1990s, there was a 
push toward returning to a more punitive approach, and today, 
“the mantra ‘adult time for adult crime’ has become a reality 
for many young offenders.”72 
While at first glance it may appear that a juvenile and an 
adult are receiving the same sentence for committing the same 
crime, “adolescents are paying in a different currency.”73 Juve-
niles serving sentences in adult criminal facilities are subject to 
abuse, sexual victimization, a greater risk of suicide, and a 
higher rate of recidivism.74 Although adult inmates are also 
subject to assault and other forms of abuse, adolescents are at a 
greater risk of experiencing these harms.75 Due to their age, 
“their relative lack of experience in these settings, their smaller 
size and strength, and their potential lack of interpersonal so-
phistication, it is just commonsensical that adolescents in adult 
facilities are easy potential targets for a variety of forms of vic-
timization.”76 
Referring to findings by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, a 
report authored by the Campaign for Youth Justice noted 
“youth under the age of 18 represented 21 percent of all sub-
stantiated victims of inmate-on-inmate sexual violence in jails 
in 2005, and 13 percent in 2006—surprisingly high since only 
one percent of jail inmates are juveniles.”77 In response to ado-
lescents in adult facilities experiencing these harms, scholars 
have argued, “It just does not seem fair to expose juvenile of-
fenders to an increased likelihood of being raped, infected with 
 
 72. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 41, at 553; see also Richard E. Redding 
& James C. Howell, Blended Sentencing in American Juvenile Courts, in THE 
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 145 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. 
Zimring eds., 2000) (“Juvenile justice has come full circle in this century. With 
the creation of juvenile courts one hundred years ago, reformers achieved their 
objective of removing juveniles from the harsh, punishment-oriented criminal 
justice system. Now, juvenile justice is once again embracing criminal court 
handling of certain juvenile offenders and diminishing the role of the juvenile 
court.”). 
 73. Edward P. Mulvey & Carol A. Schubert, Youth in Prison and Beyond, 
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra 
note 43, at 849. 
 74. See Raise the Age Campaign Fact Sheet, RAISE THE AGE NY, 
http://raisetheageny.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Raise-the-Age-NY 
-Campaign-Fact-Sheet-2017.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2017). 
 75. Mulvey & Schubert, supra note 73, at 846–47. 
 76. Id. at 846. 
 77. RYAN, supra note 33, at 5 (citation omitted). 
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HIV/AIDS, beaten up, or terrorized while serving their pun-
ishment for a serious offense.”78 
Whether or not to separate juveniles from adults in adult 
correctional facilities is not an easy question. In its report, the 
Campaign for Youth Justice explains that adult facility officials 
are placed in a Catch-22 situation when determining whether 
to separate juveniles from their adult inmates, or integrate the 
groups together.79 If the juveniles are integrated with their 
adult counterparts, the juveniles risk “serious physical and 
emotional harm.”80 However, if “officials do separate youth 
from adults, they are often placed in isolation for long periods 
of time. This equates to solitary confinement and can lead to 
depression, exacerbate already existing mental health issues, 
and put youth at risk of suicide.”81 Raise the Age, a New York-
based public awareness campaign, contends, “Youth are 36 
times more likely to commit suicide in an adult facility than in 
a juvenile facility.”82 While certain federal statutes, such as the 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA), 
were passed with the intention of providing greater protections 
to juvenile offenders, the “sight and sound” separation provi-
sion of the Act—requiring juveniles to be separated from adult 
inmates—does not apply to juveniles who were prosecuted as 
adults in adult criminal courts.83 
In addition to the physical and psychological harms associ-
ated with confining juveniles in adult correctional facilities, ju-
veniles transferred to the adult criminal system are also more 
likely to reoffend. The Task Force on Community Preventive 
Services found that “juveniles adjudicated in the adult criminal 
court, were, in general, at a near 34 percent greater likelihood 
to be arrested for a subsequent crime than were the youths 
whose cases were handled in the juvenile system.”84 This is 
likely due in part to the “ongoing process of ‘prisonization’—
adaptation to prison through identification with the role of be-
 
 78. Mulvey & Schubert, supra note 73, at 846. 
 79. RYAN, supra note 33, at 4. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. RAISE THE AGE NY, supra note 74. 
 83. RYAN, supra note 33. 
 84. OLA LISOWSKI & MARC LEVIN, MACIVER INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, 17 
YEAR OLDS IN ADULT COURT: IS THERE A BETTER ALTERNATIVE FOR WISCON-
SIN’S YOUTH AND TAXPAYERS? 8 (2016); see also RAISE THE AGE NY, supra note 
74 (stating that recidivism rates are higher for youths held in adult facilities). 
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ing a criminal among criminals.”85 The criminal identity has 
“an immediate and compelling purpose” behind bars “with little 
opportunity or benefit from exploring alternative identities.”86 
As some scholars contend, “In the longer term, transfer seems 
only to increase the risk to public safety.”87 Although “‘get 
tough’ policies promoting long sentences for youths transferred 
to the adult system . . . imply that transfer to adult court pro-
duces long confinement in an adult facility,” adolescents who 
receive adult criminal convictions will not necessarily serve 
lengthy sentences so as to keep them from reentering society 
later on.88 Based on some reports, over “a hundred thousand 
young adults, aged 18–24, will be released from federal or state 
prisons each year.”89 
Last, but not least, are the significant collateral conse-
quences associated with an adult criminal conviction that can 
continue well beyond the juvenile’s sentence itself. Such reper-
cussions include reduced educational and employment options, 
possible eviction and/or deportation, losing the right to vote and 
other government benefits, and much more.90 With regard to 
educational opportunities, adolescents may experience severe 
barriers, even if the charge did not result in a conviction and/or 
the alleged offense took place off school grounds.91 A report on 
collateral consequences for juvenile offenders found that over 
fifty percent of adolescents in confinement have not finished 
the eighth grade, and two-thirds of youth returning from for-
mal custody do not go back to school.92 While record expunge-
ment may be possible in cases that are retained in the juvenile 
justice system, it is no longer an option once the juvenile has 
 
 85. Mulvey & Schubert, supra note 73. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Feld & Bishop, supra note 43, at 832 (“The simple fact of being tried 
as an adult, regardless of the criminal sentence, appears to aggravate youths’ 
recidivism.”). 
 88. Mulvey & Schubert, supra note 73, at 854. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Angel Zang, U.S. Age Boundaries of Delinquency 2015, JJGPS 
STATESCAN (Nat’l Ctr. for Juvenile Justice, Pittsburgh, P.A.), Apr. 2016, 
http://www.ncjj.org/pdf/JJGPS%20StateScan/JJGPS_U.S._age_boundaries_of_ 
delinquency_2015_8.pdf; Ashley Nellis, Addressing the Collateral Consequenc-
es of Convictions for Young Offenders, THE CHAMPION (Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal 
Def. Lawyers, Washington, D.C.), July/Aug. 2011, http://sentencingproject.org/
wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Addressing-the-Collateral-Consequences-of 
-Convictions-for-Young-Offenders.pdf. 
 91. Nellis, supra note 90, at 22. 
 92. Id. 
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been transferred to adult court.93 Additionally, even if the case 
remains in the juvenile justice system, not all juvenile cases are 
eligible for expungement. The report on collateral consequences 
revealed that “[i]n about half of the states . . . adjudication for 
offenses that would be felonies if committed by an adult are not 
eligible for record expungement.”94 
In addition to facing education and employment barriers 
due to involvement in the justice system, a juvenile may risk 
eviction, deportation, and the loss of other fundamental rights. 
Based on the National Affordable Housing Act of 1996—and 
the subsequent Supreme Court ruling in 2002 that the offense 
of a relative could lead to the lawful eviction of public housing 
residents—a youth’s conviction may result in an entire family 
facing eviction.95 And regardless of a youth’s age, if the juve-
nile’s case is transferred to adult court and results in a criminal 
conviction, “an alien resident can and frequently does . . . [face] 
deportation.”96 Additionally, a juvenile whose case results in an 
adult criminal conviction may risk “a lifetime disenfranchise-
ment in some states—even before reaching legal voting age.”97 
Over the last decade, the U.S. Supreme Court has recog-
nized the inherent differences between juveniles and adults 
and how those differences should impact sentencing. Beginning 
in 2005, the Court held in Roper v. Simmons that imposing the 
death penalty on offenders who were younger than eighteen 
years of age at the time of the offense violates the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.98 In 2010, the Court held in Graham 
v. Florida that imposing a life imprisonment without parole 
(LWOP) sentence on a juvenile convicted of a non-homicide of-
fense violates the Eighth Amendment.99 Citing Roper, the 
Court stated that “developments in psychology and brain sci-
ence continue to show fundamental differences between juve-
nile and adult minds.”100 In 2012, the Court held in Miller v. 
Alabama that imposing mandatory LWOP sentences on juve-
nile offenders violates the Eighth Amendment.101 Citing to 
 
 93. Id. at 21. 
 94. Id. at 23. 
 95. Id. (referencing Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 
(2002)). 
 96. Id. at 21. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 99. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
 100. Id. at 68. 
 101. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012). 
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Roper and Graham, the Court stated the two cases both “estab-
lish[ed] that children are constitutionally different from adults 
for purposes of sentencing. Because juveniles have diminished 
culpability and greater prospects for reform . . . ‘they are less 
deserving of the most severe punishments.’”102 
The following Section discusses blended sentencing 
schemes, which involve “a hybridization of juvenile and adult 
justice philosophies.”103 As some scholars contend, such 
schemes evolved out of an effort to reconcile society’s harsh pu-
nitive response to the superpredator scare with the traditional 
rehabilitative spirit of the juvenile justice system.104 
C. THE INTERMEDIATE STATUS OF BLENDED SENTENCING 
DISPOSITIONS AND MINNESOTA’S PASSAGE OF EXTENDED 
JURISDICTION JUVENILE 
Blended sentencing schemes, which vary from state to 
state depending on the state’s particular model, allow judges to 
impose either, or both, a juvenile court disposition and adult 
criminal court sentence on certain juvenile offenders.105 There 
are five types of blended sentencing schemes:106 (1) juvenile-
exclusive blended sentencing; (2) juvenile-inclusive blended 
sentencing; (3) juvenile-contiguous blended sentencing; (4) 
criminal-exclusive blended sentencing; and (5) criminal-
inclusive blended sentencing.107 
Under a juvenile-exclusive model, a juvenile judge may 
impose either a juvenile disposition or an adult sentence, either 
of which becomes effective immediately.108 Under New Mexico’s 
juvenile-exclusive model, for example, youth are tried in “juve-
 
 102. Id. at 471 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 68). 
 103. Shear, supra note 68, at 220. 
 104. Id. But see Shelly S. Schaefer & Christopher Uggen, Blended Sentenc-
ing Laws and the Punitive Turn in Juvenile Justice, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
435, 454 (2016) (“[T]he turn toward blended sentencing for juveniles largely 
parallels the punitive turn in adult sentencing and corrections rather than re-
affirming the historic individualized treatment emphasis of the juvenile court. 
While blended sentences may indeed represent a ‘last chance’ for juveniles be-
fore they are waived to adult court or an ‘alternative to expansion of other 
means of transfer to criminal court,’ they were likely enacted, in part, to ex-
pand harsh criminal punishments to a larger class of youthful law violators.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 105. Cheesman, supra note 65, at 113. 
 106. FELD, supra note 38, at 587; see also Cheesman, supra note 65, at 114 
(listing sentencing schemes). 
 107. FELD, supra note 38, at 587. 
 108. Cheesman, supra note 65, at 113; see also FELD, supra note 38, at 587. 
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nile court with adult criminal procedural safeguards” and after 
a juvenile is found guilty, the judge may impose either a juve-
nile or adult sentence.109 If the youth receives an adult sen-
tence, juvenile court jurisdiction is terminated and the youth is 
transferred to the adult criminal justice system.110 Under a ju-
venile-inclusive scheme—the model under which Minnesota’s 
EJJ operates—a juvenile judge imposes both a juvenile disposi-
tion and an adult sentence, the execution of which is stayed 
pending successful completion of the juvenile disposition.111 
Under the juvenile-contiguous model, a juvenile judge may 
impose a juvenile disposition, but if the duration of the sanction 
exceeds the age of juvenile court jurisdiction, then the juvenile 
is transferred to the adult system under which the remainder 
of their sentence is served.112 Juveniles subject to this model 
are at risk of receiving significant adult sentences.113 For ex-
ample, Texas’s juvenile-contiguous model “greatly increases the 
power of juvenile courts to impose substantial sentences on 
youths below fifteen years of age . . . as well as on older juve-
niles, and gives prosecutors a powerful plea bargaining tool and 
alternative to adult prosecution.”114 In 1995, Texas’s list of six 
offenses for which a judge could order a determinate sentence 
increased to thirteen, and the maximum length of a determi-
nate sentence increased from thirty years to forty years.115 
Similar to the juvenile-exclusive and juvenile-inclusive 
schemes, under the criminal-exclusive model, a criminal court 
judge imposes either a juvenile or adult court sentence. And 
under the criminal-inclusive model, a criminal court judge im-
poses both a juvenile and adult sentence, but the adult sen-
tence is stayed pending completion of probation.116 Blended 
 
 109. FELD, supra note 38, at 588. 
 110. Redding & Howell, supra note 72, at 151–52 (explaining that such a 
scheme is present in three states: Massachusetts, Michigan, and New Mexico). 
 111. FELD, supra note 38, at 589; see also NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUS-
TICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS 2014: NATIONAL REPORT 105, 
https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/nr2014/downloads/NR2014.pdf (explaining that 
ten of the fourteen states with blended sentencing laws originating in juvenile 
court have “inclusive blends”). 
 112. FELD, supra note 38, at 588. See NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, 
supra note 111, at 105 (explaining that Colorado, Rhode Island and Texas 
“have some type of contiguous blended sentencing arrangement”). 
 113. Redding & Howell, supra note 72, at 152. 
 114. FELD, supra note 38, at 589. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 587; see also NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 111, 
at 105–06 (explaining that of the eighteen states that allow blended sentenc-
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sentencing models were present in sixteen states by 1995, and 
twenty-six states by 2004.117 
Minnesota spearheaded the promulgation of juvenile-
inclusive blended sentencing schemes when it began working 
on the nation’s first model in 1992.118 Minnesota’s Juvenile 
Justice Task Force was appointed to review and propose 
amendments to statutes governing the sentencing of juvenile 
offenders.119 Included in the Task Force’s recommendations 
was the creation of “an intermediate category of young offend-
ers who could receive extended sentences in juvenile court.”120 
This intermediate category—Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile—
would provide juvenile offenders with the procedural safe-
guards of adult criminal court, such as a right to a jury trial, 
given the juvenile would receive both a juvenile disposition and 
an adult criminal sentence.121 EJJ was intended to provide ju-
veniles with “one last chance at success in the juvenile system” 
and the Task Force “discussed how to prevent ‘one last chance’ 
from becoming two or three, or four more chances.”122 One of 
the motivations behind EJJ, which extended juvenile court ju-
risdiction to an offender’s twenty-first birthday, was the belief 
that such an extension would reduce the number of youths cer-
tified as adults.123 
To be designated an EJJ youth, the adolescent must be be-
tween the age of fourteen and seventeen and be alleged to have 
committed a felony offense.124 The juvenile felony offender may 
be designated an EJJ youth in one of three ways: “[A]utomatic, 
presumptive, [or] designated.”125 Under the automatic EJJ des-
 
ing in criminal court, eleven states have criminal-exclusive blends and seven 
states have criminal-inclusive blends). 
 117. Cheesman, supra note 65, at 113. 
 118. Shear, supra note 68, at 220. 
 119. Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 9, at 1005. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 1009, 1013. Minnesota’s system of “[t]rying youths in juvenile 
courts with adult criminal procedural safeguards preserves access to juvenile 
correctional resources, provides longer periods of correctional supervision and 
control, and retains the possibility of adult incarceration if youths fail on pro-
bation or re-offend.” FELD, supra note 38, at 589–90. 
 122. Feld, supra note 8, at 1047. 
 123. Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 9, at 1010 (explaining that prior to EJJ, 
juvenile court jurisdiction ended when a juvenile turned nineteen. The age 
cut-off “restricted juvenile courts’ authority to impose appropriate sanctions on 
older youths and encouraged judges to certify some juveniles who did not nec-
essarily require extended adult incarceration”). 
 124. MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subdiv. 1 (2017). 
 125. Santelmann & Rafferty, supra note 11, at 432. 
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ignation, the prosecutor may designate the proceeding as an 
EJJ prosecution if the juvenile was at least sixteen years of age 
at the time of the alleged offense and is alleged to have commit-
ted either a felony offense while using a firearm or an offense 
for which the Sentencing Guidelines presume a commitment to 
prison.126 Under the presumptive EJJ designation, a case must 
be designated as EJJ if, following a certification hearing, the 
juvenile court denies the prosecutor’s motion for adult certifica-
tion in which the presumption of certification applies.127 Lastly, 
a case may be designated as EJJ if the child was between four-
teen and seventeen years of age at the time of the offense and 
either the court designates the case as EJJ following a certifi-
cation hearing,128 or the court designates the case as EJJ fol-
lowing a hearing on the issue at the prosecutor’s request.129 
In addition to creating this intermediate category of young 
offenders, the Task Force also revised the state’s adult certifi-
cation procedure, “link[ing] the definition of serious juvenile of-
fenders to the definition of serious offenses in the adult sen-
tencing guidelines.”130 Rather than requiring judges to address 
“unanswerable questions about a youth’s ‘amenability to 
treatment’ or ‘dangerousness,’” as certification procedures had 
done in the past, “the Task Force proposed using more objective 
offense criteria to define ‘public safety.’”131 In both adult certifi-
cation proceedings and EJJ designations, the six public safety 
factors outlined in the certification statute are to be considered. 
The factors focus on the severity of the current offense and the 
culpability of the offender, the juvenile’s prior record and pro-
gramming history, as well as the punishment, programming 
and dispositional options available for the child.132 
But, unlike adult certification hearings, which ask whether 
public safety is better served by transferring the youth from the 
juvenile to the adult court system, probation revocation hear-
ings of EJJ youth do not focus on public safety. Rather, the fo-
 
 126. MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subdiv. 1(2). 
 127. Id. § 260B.125, subdiv. 8. 
 128. Id. § 260B.130, subdiv. 1(1). 
 129. Id. § 260B.130, subdiv. 1(3). 
 130. FELD, supra note 38, at 583. 
 131. Id; see also Feld, supra note 8, at 968 (explaining that the new statute 
governing certification “shift[ed] judicial focus from clinical subjectivity and an 
offender ’s ‘amenability to treatment’ to more objective ‘public safety’ offense 
criteria that mirror the Sentencing Guidelines’ emphases on the seriousness of 
the present offense and prior record”). 
 132. MINN. STAT. § 260B.125, subdiv. 4. 
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cus is on whether or not a youth violated probation. Under Rule 
19.11 of the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Delinquency Proce-
dure, a court must make three written findings in order to exe-
cute the stayed criminal sentence. The court must find that “(a) 
one or more conditions of probation were violated; (b) the viola-
tion was intentional or inexcusable; and (c) the need for con-
finement outweighs the policies favoring probation.”133 While 
some members of the Task Force advocated for the automatic 
execution of the stayed adult sentence in the event of either a 
probation violation or the commission of a new offense, the 
Task Force ultimately recommended that probation violations 
of EJJ youth should be treated in the same manner as proba-
tion violations or new offenses committed by adults.134 Shortly 
after the statute was enacted, Professor Barry Feld, who served 
as a member and subcommittee chair of the Task Force, wrote, 
“Although provisions to revoke probation and execute the adult 
sentences are essential elements of the EJJ status, some Task 
Force members feared that many youths might enter adult fa-
cilities through this procedural back door.”135 Unfortunately, as 
Part II discusses further, Minnesota’s blended sentencing 
scheme has had a significant net-widening impact and has re-
sulted in other unintended consequences due to its structure 
and implementation. 
II.  THE SHORTFALLS OF MINNESOTA’S EXTENDED 
JURISDICTION JUVENILE AND EVALUATING THE 
EFFICACY OF JUVENILE PROBATION AS A PRACTICE   
Following the creation of blended sentencing schemes in 
several states across the country, authors Redding and Howell 
posed the question: “Does blended sentencing narrow the net of 
juveniles channeled into the criminal justice system . . . [o]r 
does it widen the net of juveniles subject to adult sentences?”136 
 
 133. MINN. R. JUV. P. 19.11, subdiv. 3(C)(2). Rule 19.11 of the Minnesota 
Rules of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure incorporates consideration of the 
three Austin factors enunciated in State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246 (Minn. 
1980). State v. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d 763 (Minn. 2003), made the Austin factors 
applicable to EJJ probation revocation proceedings. See Santelmann & Raffer-
ty, supra note 11, at 435 (explaining that since Austin, “the three factors ar-
ticulated in the decision have become the cornerstone of any trial court’s deci-
sion to revoke adult probation. However, until B.Y. the Austin factors had not 
been applied to EJJ probation revocation proceedings”). 
 134. Feld, supra note 8, at 1047–48. 
 135. Feld, supra note 8, at 1050. 
 136. Redding & Howell, supra note 72, at 160. 
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Unfortunately, Minnesota’s blended sentencing scheme has 
created a significant net-widening effect on the number of 
youths transferred to the adult criminal system—that is, it 
“subject[s] more young offenders to the possibility of adult crim-
inal sentences than occurred under the traditional judicial 
waiver law.”137 Studies have shown the sentencing scheme has 
had a disproportionate impact on racial minorities and on 
younger and less criminally sophisticated offenders.138 As the 
federal government has noted, “Because juvenile blended sen-
tencing thresholds are actually lower than transfer thresholds 
in most states, there is a possibility that such laws, instead of 
providing a mitigating alternative to transfer, are instead being 
used for an ‘in-between’ category of cases that would not other-
wise have been transferred at all.”139 Other studies have found 
that “EJJs had more serious charges than transfers, raising 
doubts about whether transfer was being reserved for the 
‘worst of the worst’ and blended-sentencing cases for the ‘least 
worst of the worst,’” and that “[m]inorities were more likely to 
be motioned by the prosecutor for transfer or EJJ than white 
juvenile offenders.”140 
In addition to highlighting the unintended impact such a 
statute has had on the state’s youth, Part II argues that revok-
ing a juvenile’s probation and executing his stayed adult sen-
tence for probation violations, rather than for new offenses, 
demonstrates a misunderstanding of how criminal justice sys-
tem involvement affects youth and impacts their future.141 This 
practice also ignores critical implications of adolescent brain 
development. 
A. EJJ’S NET-WIDENING EFFECT AND OTHER UNINTENDED 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 
Minnesota’s blended sentencing statute was formulated “to 
open a door to the future for juveniles who have committed se-
rious offenses but for whom rehabilitation in a juvenile setting 
meets the interests of public safety.”142 Although the scheme 
was created to give youthful offenders another chance at re-
 
 137. Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 9, at 1028. 
 138. Id. at 1031–33. 
 139. Griffin et al., supra note 30, at 7. 
 140. Cheesman, supra note 65, at 114. 
 141. See SCHAEFER & ERICKSON, supra note 25 (discussing the effects of 
confinement on youths’ psychosocial development). 
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maining within the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts, Minneso-
ta’s blended sentencing model has “had a substantial net-
widening impact.”143 Most EJJ youth are charged with serious 
offenses, however prior to the passage of Minnesota’s EJJ stat-
ute, many of these youth would have been treated as ordinary 
juvenile delinquents.144 Minnesota’s “intermediate sanction ap-
pears to sentence more severely offenders who otherwise would 
have been dealt with as ordinary delinquents rather than those 
who previously were bound for prison.”145 
An analysis of data collected from Hennepin County, Min-
nesota between 1995 and 1997 reported that the majority of 
probation revocations of EJJ youth were for technical probation 
violations rather than for committing new crimes.146 The study 
found “the combination of an initial EJJ status and a subse-
quent probation revocation consigned a substantial number of 
juveniles to prison who likely would not have been waived or 
imprisoned under the previous waiver law or in the context of a 
‘public safety’ certification hearing.”147 
Minnesota’s statute has had a particularly harsh impact on 
younger offenders. Prior to the creation of EJJ, most transfer 
motions (sixty percent) were filed against seventeen-year-olds, 
whereas only three percent were filed against fourteen-year-
olds and seven percent against fifteen-year-olds.148 After the 
passage of Minnesota’s EJJ, “[m]ore than two-out-of-five 
(41.5%) youths against whom prosecutors filed EJJ motions 
were only fourteen- or fifteen-years of age at the time of their 
offenses.”149 The statute has also had a disproportionate impact 
on minorities: “Over 79% of the youth against whom prosecu-
tors filed waiver and EJJ motions were members of racial mi-
norities.”150 
A report by the head prosecutor of the Ramsey County, 
Minnesota, Juvenile Prosecution Section found that lower 
courts were “exercising significant discretion when deciding 
 
 143. Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 9, at 1030; see also Feld & Bishop, su-
pra note 43, at 823 (“[J]uvenile court judges do not use [blended sentences] in 
lieu of transfer, but instead impose them on less serious offenders, which re-
sults in ‘net widening.’”). 
 144. FELD, supra note 38, at 598. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 9, at 1059. 
 147. Id. at 1063. 
 148. Id. at 1031–32. 
 149. Id. at 1032. 
 150. Id. at 1033. 
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whether to execute the stayed adult sentence,” which “ap-
pear[ed] consistent with the Task Force’s recommendation to 
treat EJJ probation violations in the same manner as adult vio-
lation proceedings.”151 Might such an exercise of discretion po-
tentially do more harm than good? Several scholars and practi-
tioners have expressed their concerns with this discretion, 
especially given EJJ was intended to be reserved for a particu-
lar category of youthful offenders. As scholars have noted, most 
juvenile offenders do not need to be incarcerated, and waiver 
laws should be reserved for a special class of youths; “Except in 
rare instances, these will be older adolescents who have 
demonstrated by the severity and chronicity of their offending 
that they deserve to be incarcerated for lengthy periods and 
that the public needs to be protected from them.”152 
Unfortunately, given the great leverage EJJ provides to 
prosecutors, many EJJ youth are designated as a result of a 
plea agreement,153 and as practitioners have noted, many are 
young, first-time offenders. While “it is often preferable to bring 
a motion for [adult] certification” from the perspective of the 
prosecutor,154 EJJ “increase[s] prosecutors’ plea bargaining 
leverage by enabling them to coerce pleas to [an] extended sen-
tence[] in lieu of outright transfer [to adult court].”155 Criticiz-
ing blended sentencing as a prosecutorial power grab, one au-
thor wrote, “If the enhancement of prosecutorial power was 
sought and plea-bargaining was encouraged, then blended sen-
tencing is just what the district attorney ordered.”156 
 
 151. Santelmann & Lillesand, supra note 8, at 1323. 
 152. Feld & Bishop, supra note 43, at 833 (emphasis added); see also Red-
ding & Howell, supra note 72, at 166 (stating that blended sentencing schemes 
should “target only serious and violent juvenile offenders who have an exten-
sive prior offending history.”). 
 153. Feld & Bishop, supra note 43, at 823. 
 154. Santelmann & Lillesand, supra note 8, at 1315. 
 155. Feld & Bishop, supra note 43, at 823; see also Redding & Howell, su-
pra note 72, at 157 (explaining that blended sentencing “sets up a classic plea 
bargaining situation: prosecutors use the threat of criminal court transfer as 
leverage against juveniles to waive their right to a jury trial, plead guilty, 
and/or agree to a certain sentence”). 
 156. Franklin E. Zimring, The Power Politics of Juvenile Court Transfer: A 
Mildly Revisionist History of the 1990s, 71 LA. L. REV. 1, 14 (2010). 
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B. EVALUATING THE EFFICACY OF JUVENILE PROBATION IN 
LIGHT OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF ADOLESCENT BRAIN 
DEVELOPMENT 
A corollary to a blended sentence is a longer period of mon-
itoring. While an EJJ disposition gives a juvenile the oppor-
tunity to stay out of the adult criminal system, the adolescent 
is on probation with the court until their twenty-first birthday, 
rather than until age nineteen as an ordinary delinquent.157 
For any person, the possibility of staying out of prison—or, 
even better, going home—may sound like a good deal. However 
adolescents who generally “show less ability to make judgments 
and decisions that require future orientation,”158 may be unable 
to fully understand the impact probation will have on their dai-
ly lives going forward. As the American Psychological Associa-
tion (APA) pointed out in its amicus brief in Roper, sixteen-and 
seventeen-year-olds, “as a group, are not yet mature in ways 
that affect their decision-making” due to the under-
development of an adolescent’s frontal lobes of the brain.159 As 
the APA explained, “The frontal lobes, especially the prefrontal 
cortex, play a critical role in the executive or ‘CEO’ functions of 
the brain,” and an under-developed frontal lobe “has been asso-
ciated with greater impulsivity, difficulties in concentration, at-
tention, and self-monitoring, and impairments in decision-
making.”160 “At first blush, community-based probation seems 
to allow justice-involved youth to avoid the detrimental effects 
of confinement,” however, partly due to these biological im-
pairments, “about half of juveniles on probation fail to comply 
with their requirements at some time while under court super-
vision.”161 
While the executive functions of adolescent brains continue 
to develop into adulthood, adolescents actually exhibit height-
ened activity in the nucleus accumbens, which is an area of the 
 
 157. MINN. R. JUV. P. 19.01(2)(A) (“[J]urisdiction of the juvenile court may 
continue until the child’s twenty-first (21st) birthday.”). 
 158. See Nat’l Research Council, Reforming Juvenile Justice: A Develop-
mental Approach, in LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 17, at 545. 
 159. Brief for the Am. Psychological Ass’n, & the Mo. Psychological Ass’n as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 5, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 
(2005) (No. 03-633) 2004 WL 1636447 at *2. 
 160. Id. at 9–10, 2004 WL 1636447 at *2. 
 161. Naomi E.S. Goldstein et al., “You’re on the Right Track!” Using Grad-
uated Response Systems to Address Immaturity of Judgment and Enhance 
Youths’ Capacities to Successfully Complete Probation, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 803, 
804 (2016). 
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brain rich in dopamine and responsible for seeking pleasure 
and reward.162 The limbic system, responsible for these socio-
emotional processes and including parts of the brain such as 
the nucleus accumbens, the hippocampus, and the amygdala, 
generally matures more rapidly than the system responsible for 
executive controls, which results in an imbalance between the 
two systems.163 As a result of this imbalance “it has been sug-
gested that the emotionally driven reactions of an adolescent’s 
more developed limbic system often prevail over the rational 
reasoning of his or her underdeveloped prefrontal cortex during 
socially or emotionally charged situations.”164 Thus, while a ju-
venile may be able to demonstrate cognitive functioning skills 
necessary to comply with the terms of their probation, such as 
abstaining from alcohol use or engaging in destructive activity, 
while in the presence of their probation officer, many juveniles 
would struggle to exhibit these capabilities “when faced with 
distracting social or emotional situations” out in their commu-
nities.165 
Data collected by the Department of Justice revealed that 
over “16% of all youth in juvenile correctional centers were 
committed or detained for technical probation violations” that 
are “typically not criminal in nature; instead, they involve acts 
that defy court-mandated conditions, like failing to attend 
school, missing curfew, or failing to meet with a probation of-
ficer as scheduled.”166 While this may be the traditional re-
sponse to disobedient probationers, studies indicate that dis-
proportionate sanctions are not more effective than 
proportionate ones.167 Rather, overly punitive responses “tend[] 
to lose [their] effectiveness over time, as youths become accus-
tomed to the negative experiences” and “believe the negative 
consequences are unavoidable,” developing what is known as 
“learned helplessness.”168 
Once juveniles are taken out of their communities and 
placed in residential facilities, they are subject to developing 
mood disorders, such as depression, “increasing the chances 
 
 162. See id. at 813. 
 163. See id.; see also Nat’l Research Council, supra note 158, at 549. 
 164. Goldstein et al., supra note 161, at 813. 
 165. Id. at 812. 
 166. Amanda NeMoyer et al., Predictors of Juveniles’ Noncompliance with 
Probation Requirements, 38 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 580, 581 (2014). 
 167. Goldstein et al., supra note 161, at 829. 
 168. Id. at 820–21. 
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that they will engage in self-harming behavior.”169 Once re-
leased, “formerly incarcerated juveniles often exhibit poor aca-
demic performance, face reduced earnings, and obtain fewer job 
opportunities.”170 Studies indicate that “70–80% of incarcerated 
juveniles still recidivate within 2–3 years of release.”171 On top 
of all this, it is worth noting that studies have found that ap-
proximately two-thirds of incarcerated juveniles suffer with a 
mental health condition, and in a pertinent survey it was found 
that “approximately 70% of the group with a mental health 
problem also had a substance use disorder.”172 
Confinement during adolescence has a severe impact on an 
individual. As noted previously, there are significant collateral 
consequences associated with a criminal conviction—and in 
some circumstances, even a delinquent adjudication. Addition-
ally, there are serious implications on an adolescent’s emotional 
and psychological development. A recent study emphasized how 
confinement—and any involvement in the juvenile system—
impacts a youth’s future.173 
EJJ youth serving time in group homes and other juvenile 
institutions are being confined during a critical time of “psycho-
logical development and maturation.”174 As the authors of the 
study on confined youth explained: 
Because juvenile correctional facilities operate under strict surveil-
lance and are gender-segregated, the social context for development 
changes; confined youth are not able to practice skills associated with 
developing perspective . . . responsibility . . . and temperance . . . that 
in turn promote the successful transition to adulthood.175 
Further, the authors contend, it is mistaken to believe that 
formerly confined youth re-offend as a result of “poor choic-
 
 169. NeMoyer et al., supra note 166. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Mulvey & Schubert, supra note 73, at 855; see generally THOMAS 
GRISSO, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: ADOLESCENT OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL DISOR-
DERS (Franklin E. Zimring ed., 2004) (discussing the prevalence of mental 
health conditions among adolescent offenders). 
 173. See SCHAEFER & ERICKSON, supra note 25, at 15 (“[A]s youth exit cor-
rectional facilities and struggle to transition to the community, they are lag-
ging further behind other youth in their self-clarity, self-esteem, decision-
making, and future orientation. . . . Despite hopes that a period of confinement 
can be the turning point leading youth out of future offending behavior, the 
barriers produced by the context of confinement have real consequences for 
the development of psychosocial maturity and attainment in adulthood.”). 
 174. Id. at 5. 
 175. Id. at 5–6. 
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es.”176 As the authors point out, typically, a person’s adoles-
cence is associated with “trial and error”; however, highly con-
fined youth are given “few opportunities for developmental 
failure.”177 The authors suggest that programming available to 
juveniles should provide “room for autonomy and failure,” and 
should “teach youth to build on failure as a natural part of de-
velopment.”178 Critically, the authors’ quantitative analysis re-
vealed that “not only confined youth, but also arrestees . . . 
have poorer outcomes in the transition to adulthood.”179 The 
authors emphasized that it is not merely confinement, but any 
“formal juvenile justice intervention” that can inadvertently 
harm a youth going forward.180 
Currently, the “structure of most juvenile probation sys-
tems fails to recognize the unique characteristics of adolescent 
development, and thus, many youths likely fail to comply with 
probation, facing harsh consequences.”181 As a result of this 
detrimental impact on youth engaged in the juvenile justice 
system, a recent study suggested revising the current approach 
of juvenile probation so that it incorporates sensitivities to the 
important biological differences of adolescents compared to 
adults. The current structure of juvenile probation closely re-
flects that of adult probation, in that the system focuses more 
on what the juvenile does wrong, rather than rewarding com-
pliant behaviors.182 Such a system “fails to recognize the power 
of positive reinforcement in shaping behavior over time.”183 The 
study suggests reframing juvenile probation in a way that 
helps juveniles better understand and appreciate the terms of 
their probation, provides short-term positive reinforcement for 
 
 176. Id. at 15 (citing a study which “uncovered the complexity between in-
carceration and psychosocial maturity that ultimately made it difficult for 
young offenders to meet the demands and expectations of adulthood upon re-
lease”). 
 177. Id. at 17. 
 178. Id. (emphasis added). 
 179. Id. at 16. 
 180. Id. (noting that this result is “surprising given this is the very system 
intervening on the ‘best interests of the child’”). See generally Mulvey & Schu-
bert, supra note 73 (discussing the impact of adult prisons on youth both dur-
ing and after confinement and the challenges they face as they reenter their 
communities). 
 181. Goldstein et al., supra note 161, at 819. 
 182. Id. at 808–09. 
 183. Id. at 809; see also Nat’l Research Council, supra note 158, at 546–47 
(concluding that recent studies “suggest that immediate incentives can alter 
both desirable and undesirable behavior in adolescents and may be used to 
positively alter behavior”). 
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good behavior, imposes sanctions for disobedience “in ways that 
enable youths to learn from their mistakes and modify their 
behaviors in the future,” and encourages juveniles to associate 
themselves with prosocial activities and positive peers.184 This 
“graduated response system” of juvenile probation would high-
light “effort and improvement over perfect compliance with 
probation requirements,” and would impose “predictable, pro-
portionate, and fair sanctions for noncompliant behaviors.”185 
Such a framework would provide juveniles with an opportunity 
to learn from their mistakes, “rather than removing youths 
from the community and, thus, also removing them from oppor-
tunities to revisit past choices and make better decisions in 
similar scenarios in the near future.”186 
Fortunately, the graduated response system is being im-
plemented in a growing number of jurisdictions around the 
country, including in both Hennepin County and Ramsey Coun-
ty, Minnesota.187 With a reframed approach to probation and a 
blended sentencing framework that incorporates the proposed 
changes outlined in Part III, this Note argues that Minnesota 
could be a leader in the broader movement of criminal justice 
reform and the way we treat our youth who offend. 
III.  AMENDING MINNESOTA’S EJJ TO ENSURE 
JUVENILES RECEIVE A GENUINE “ONE LAST CHANCE 
AT SUCCESS”   
Given the detrimental impact of blended sentencing 
schemes on younger and less criminally sophisticated youth, 
many scholars and practitioners question the intention of these 
laws as providing a genuine “one last chance at success” to ju-
venile offenders. While Minnesota’s juvenile-inclusive scheme 
appears to be the preferable model, its statute is far from per-
fect, and studies have shown that its implementation has re-
sulted in a significant net-widening effect and other unintended 
collateral consequences on the state’s youth.188 
Despite these challenges, Minnesota’s EJJ statute can be 
successfully amended to resolve its flaws. Although Minneso-
ta’s blended sentencing scheme was intended to treat juvenile 
probationers similarly to their adult counterparts, adolescents 
 
 184. See Goldstein et al., supra note 161, at 819, 830. 
 185. Id. at 828–29. 
 186. Id. at 829–30. 
 187. See id. at 825 n.120. 
 188. See supra Part II.A. 
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are “constitutionally different”189 and “[p]olicies that equate ju-
veniles with adults in the name of retribution—‘old enough to 
do the crime, old enough to do the time’—ignore fundamental 
differences between adolescents and adults.”190 This Part ar-
gues that the ease with which probation can be revoked, and a 
stayed criminal sentence executed, requires the legislature to 
amend Minnesota’s EJJ statute. The statute should require (1) 
the commission of a new crime; and (2) certain procedural safe-
guards before a juvenile judge can revoke juvenile probation 
and execute the stayed adult sentence.191 Additionally, the 
statute should be amended to include a stay of imposition in 
addition to the stay of execution.192 Under a stay of imposition, 
a juvenile’s felony sentence would be reduced to a gross misde-
meanor, if and when probation is successfully completed. Part 
III concludes by arguing that if Minnesota’s EJJ statute is 
amended and implemented appropriately, then it may serve as 
a model for other states’ blended sentencing schemes. 
A. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO MINNESOTA’S EJJ STATUTE 
EJJ was created to give juveniles “one last chance at suc-
cess in the juvenile system,”193 and it was intended that the 
courts would treat probation violations of EJJ youth similarly 
to adult probationers who violate probation or commit a new 
offense.194 Adolescents, however, are “constitutionally different 
from adults for purposes of sentencing.”195 Recognizing these 
critical differences, the U.S. Supreme Court enunciated in Rop-
er that  
[f]rom a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings 
of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a 
minor ’s character deficiencies will be reformed. . . . “[T]he signature 
qualities of youth are transient; as individuals mature, the impetu-
 
 189. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012). 
 190. Feld & Bishop, supra note 43, at 831. 
 191. See Telephone Interview with Feld, supra note 27 (discussing certifi-
cation hearings as a procedural safeguard against imposing long adult sen-
tences on EJJ youth for minor violations). 
 192. See Telephone Interview with Anonymous Juvenile Public Defender, 
supra note 28 (explaining that a stay of imposition—which reduces a felony to 
a gross misdemeanor—is often made available to adult offenders, which be-
comes inherently unfair when an adult and a juvenile commit a felony crime 
together). 
 193. Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 9, at 1015 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Feld, supra note 8, at 1047–49). 
 194. Feld, supra note 8, at 1047–48. 
 195. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012). 
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ousness and recklessness that may dominate in younger years can 
subside.”196 
A report, written from the perspective of a prosecutor, stat-
ed that “the success of the Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile des-
ignation depends” in part on “juveniles appreciating that this is 
a door that has been opened for them to let in a better fu-
ture.”197 While this statement certainly holds merit, the door to 
a juvenile’s future should not be shut for merely violating the 
terms of their probation. Although smoking marijuana, for ex-
ample, may constitute a new offense, it arguably does not 
change the juvenile’s status from someone who does not pose a 
threat to public safety to one who does. Rather than focusing 
merely on what a juvenile has done wrong (failing to meet with 
a probation officer, for example, or testing positive for drug 
use), there should be a turn toward what the juvenile is doing 
right.198 The inability, or reluctance, to do so suggests an im-
portant disconnect between the State and its youth. Specifical-
ly, it demonstrates the State’s under-appreciation of the impact 
involvement in the criminal justice system has on a youth, and 
overlooks critical implications of adolescent brain develop-
ment.199 
Revocations are improper in the absence of a new offense 
and undermine the spirit of the EJJ statute. Juveniles should 
rarely be waived to the adult court system, and only “when 
their serious offenses, persistent offending, heightened culpa-
bility, active criminal participation, and clinical evaluations in-
dicate a need for minimum sentences that exceed the maximum 
sanctions available in juvenile court.”200 Thus, the statutory 
language, “[w]hen it appears that a person convicted as an ex-
tended jurisdiction juvenile has violated the conditions of the 
stayed sentence,” should be stricken from the statute so the 
subdivision of Minnesota Statute 260B.130 focusing on execu-
 
 196. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005) (emphasis added) (cita-
tion omitted); see also Feld, supra note 8, at 1011 (“Chronic offenders typically 
begin their criminal careers in their early to mid-teens, achieve their peak 
rates of criminal activity in their late teens to early-twenties, and then gradu-
ally reduce their criminal involvement.”). 
 197. Santelmann & Lillesand, supra note 8, at 1336. 
 198. See Goldstein et al., supra note 161, at 809 (explaining that the cur-
rent approach of most juvenile probation systems “emphasize[s] probationers’ 
failures to comply with requirements rather than attending to compliant be-
haviors” which “fails to recognize the power of positive reinforcement in shap-
ing behavior over time”). 
 199. See supra Part II.B. 
 200. Feld & Bishop, supra note 43, at 834. 
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tion of the adult sentence would read, “[w]hen it appears that a 
person convicted as an extended jurisdiction juvenile is alleged 
to have committed a new offense, the court may, without notice, 
revoke the stay and probation and direct that the offender be 
taken into immediate custody.”201 Such a change would help to 
ensure EJJ youth are not being sent to the adult criminal sys-
tem for a mere probation violation. 
Additionally, the EJJ statute should be amended so that 
judges deciding whether to revoke a youth’s probation and exe-
cute the stayed adult sentence must hold a hearing similar to a 
certification hearing, where the judge is to determine whether 
the juvenile actually poses a threat to public safety.202 As one 
scholar put it, shortly after the enactment of EJJ, a juvenile’s 
“‘adult’ status may now be decided in the context of [a] sum-
mary probation revocation hearing[] rather than [a] certifica-
tion hearing[].”203 The 1995–97 study referenced above re-
vealed that Minnesota’s EJJ has developed into a juvenile’s 
“‘first and last chance’ for treatment,” has “widened the net of 
criminal social control, and moved larger numbers of younger 
and less serious or chronic youths into the adult correctional 
system indirectly through the ‘back door’ of probation revoca-
tion proceedings rather than through certification hearings.”204 
Unlike adult certification determinations, EJJ revocations 
do not require a juvenile court judge to decide whether or not 
the juvenile is a public safety concern.205 A juvenile court judge 
has already determined that an EJJ youth does not belong in 
adult criminal court, and a technical probation violation should 
not alter that determination. If the State believes a juvenile be-
longs in criminal court, it should conduct something similar to 
a certification hearing, which is the appropriate forum for de-
termining whether a juvenile’s behavior warrants imprison-
ment. Although probation revocation procedures provide a pro-
bationer with the right to counsel and a contested hearing, it is 
a summary proceeding that addresses whether the terms of 
 
 201. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.130(5)(a) (2016). 
 202. See Telephone Interview with Feld, supra note 27 (discussing that 
probation violation hearings focus primarily on whether the juvenile violated 
probation rather than on issues of public safety). 
 203. Feld, supra note 8, at 1050. 
 204. Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 9, at 1070. 
 205. See MINN. R. JUV. P. 19.11(3)(C)(2) (outlining three written findings 
that the court must make in order to execute a stayed prison sentence after 
revoking EJJ status). For further discussion on probation revocations, see su-
pra Part I.C. 
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probation were violated, not whether the juvenile poses a public 
safety risk.206 
The statute should also be amended to include a stay of 
imposition, in addition to the stay of execution, which would 
provide another incentive for EJJ youth to successfully com-
plete probation.207 Minnesota Statute 260B.130, subdivision 
four should be changed to read: 
(a) If an extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution results in a guilty 
plea or finding of guilt, the court shall: (1) impose one or more juve-
nile dispositions under section 260B.198; and (2) impose an adult 
criminal sentence, the execution and imposition of which shall be 
stayed on the condition that the offender not violate the provisions of 
the disposition order and not commit a new offense.208 
Under this changed regime, a juvenile’s felony sentence would 
be reduced to a gross misdemeanor, if and when probation is 
successfully completed. This change would not only make a ju-
venile’s sentence fairer in comparison to an adult’s,209 but it 
would remove the harsh collateral consequences associated 
with a felony conviction,210 and, most importantly, incentivize 
EJJ youth to successfully complete probation to stay out of the 
adult criminal system. As studies have shown, “incentives have 
been recognized as an important component of systems promot-
ing young people’s compliance with court requirements.”211 
Others have also suggested that the statute should be 
amended so that the length of probation is reduced,212 or that 
 
 206. See MINN. R. JUV. P. 19.11(3)(C)(2). 
 207. See Telephone Interview with Anonymous Juvenile Public Defender, 
supra note 28. 
 208. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.130(4)(a) (2017). 
 209. An anonymous juvenile public defender explained that the difference 
in offering stayed impositions becomes “particularly stark” when you have, for 
example, a seventeen-year-old and an eighteen-year-old who engage in a crime 
together. The public defender explained that following the arrest, the seven-
teen-year-old gets taken to detention and is likely not entitled to bail; he gets 
an EJJ disposition and is sent off to a residential facility with a felony sen-
tence hanging over their head. On the other hand, the eighteen-year-old is en-
titled to bail, gets convicted with a stay of imposition, and after, say, five years 
of probation, the felony gets reduced to a gross misdemeanor. Telephone In-
terview with Anonymous Juvenile Public Defender, supra note 28. 
 210. See supra Part I.B for further discussion on collateral consequences. 
 211. Goldstein et al., supra note 161, at 820. 
 212. Reducing probation to an offender ’s nineteenth birthday may, howev-
er, have the inadvertent effect of certifying more youths as adults. As Pod-
kopacz and Feld explain, the prior age cut-off of nineteen “restricted juvenile 
courts’ authority to impose appropriate sanctions on older youths and encour-
aged judges to certify some older juveniles who did not necessarily require ex-
tended adult incarceration.” Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 9, at 1010. The 
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juvenile probationers should receive an annual mandatory re-
view hearing to determine whether probation supervision until 
age twenty-one is warranted.213 Again, taking into account the 
impact of incentives on adolescents, giving EJJ youth the op-
portunity to get off probation may ultimately translate into 
fewer juveniles being transferred to the adult criminal system. 
B. SERVING AS A MODEL FOR OTHER STATES’ BLENDED 
SENTENCING SCHEMES 
If Minnesota’s EJJ statute is amended and implemented 
appropriately, then it may serve as a model for other states’ 
blended sentencing schemes. As aforementioned, while far from 
perfect, the juvenile-inclusive model under which Minnesota’s 
EJJ operates appears to be the preferred model out of the 
five.214 First, EJJ dispositions originate in juvenile, rather than 
adult court.215 Second, the juvenile court maintains jurisdiction 
over the case, with an adult criminal sentence stayed pending 
successful completion of the juvenile disposition. This set up 
provides a juvenile with a “‘last chance’ at rehabilitation within 
the juvenile system,”216 and “allows flexibility in crafting sen-
tencing dispositions responsive to the juvenile’s progress in re-
habilitation while maintaining the possible consequences of an 
adult sentence.”217 Third, under Minnesota’s scheme, the juve-
nile court judge is given the authority to decide whether or not 
to transfer the juvenile to the adult criminal system. While 
there are certain guidelines the juvenile court judge must fol-
low, this scheme provides the judge with significant discretion, 
unlike automatic transfer laws, which automatically transfer 
the youth to the adult system upon reaching the jurisdictional 
 
point of EJJ is to extend juvenile court jurisdiction. If probation were to be 
shortened, then arguably the purpose of EJJ is defeated. 
 213. These suggestions were made by two different anonymous juvenile 
public defenders in separate phone interviews on January 31 and February 13, 
2017. 
 214. See Redding & Howell, supra note 72, at 169–70. 
 215. Id. at 169 (“[I]t is preferable to have blended sentencing in juvenile 
court rather than the criminal court,” given criminal court judges are likely 
“less sensitive to the immaturity and mental health problems of many juvenile 
offenders, who may be negatively influenced by the criminal culture of adult 
courts.”). 
 216. Id. at 170 (quoting Elizabeth E. Clarke, A Case for Reinventing Juve-
nile Transfer: The Record of Transfer of Juvenile Offenders to Criminal Court 
in Cook County, Illinois, 47 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 3, 4 (1996)). 
 217. Id.  
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age limit of the juvenile system.218 As some scholars contend, 
“Automatic transfer (with substantial adult sentences) provides 
no incentive or possibility for juveniles to reform.”219 The provi-
sions of such schemes “often are overinclusive”220 and “do not 
effectively target those juveniles who should be subject to adult 
sanctions.”221 
If Minnesota’s blended sentencing scheme were (1) re-
served for a special class of youthful offenders,222 rather than 
used as an effective plea bargaining tool;223 (2) implemented in 
a way that balances the interests of society with the interests of 
an EJJ youth deemed not to pose a threat to public safety; and 
(3) if it took into account the critical biological differences be-
tween adolescents and adults, then Minnesota’s EJJ would 
provide adolescent offenders with a genuine “one last chance at 
success in the juvenile system.”224 
  CONCLUSION   
While Minnesota’s blended sentencing model is far from 
perfect, this Note argues that it can be successfully amended to 
resolve its flaws. First, the EJJ statute should be amended to 
require the commission of a new criminal offense in order to 
execute the original stayed adult sentence. Second, the statute 
should be amended so that judges deciding whether to revoke a 
youth’s probation and execute the stayed adult sentence would 
be required to hold a hearing similar to a certification hearing, 
which is the proper forum for determining whether the juvenile 
actually poses a threat to public safety. And third, the statute 
should be amended to include a stay of imposition in addition to 
the stay of execution. 
If amended and implemented in a way that balances the 
interests of society with the interests of an EJJ youth deemed 
not to pose a threat to public safety, and takes into account the 
critical biological differences between adolescents and adults, 
 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. (quoting James C. Howell, Juvenile Transfers to the Criminal Jus-
tice System: State of the Art, 18 LAW & POL’Y 17 (1996)). 
 221. Id. 
 222. See id. (“[I]f blended sentencing systems are to serve as an alternative 
to transfer, then they should be structured to have maximum impact on life-
course-persistent offenders, who are responsible for as much as 75 percent of 
the violent crimes committed by adolescents.”). 
 223. See supra Part II.A. 
 224. Feld, supra note 8, at 1047. 
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then Minnesota’s EJJ statute may serve as a model for other 
states in the growing trend toward extending juvenile court ju-
risdiction and the broader movement of criminal justice reform. 
